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 Judicial Overkill
 THE CAMPUS AND THE COURTS
 By Robert M. O'Neil
 T ihe i e summer respite on the campuses following
 Cambodia and Kent State is now behind us. The academ-
 ic community waits to see whether universities may
 again be closed down during the year, and, if so, who
 will close them- students, politicians, state police or
 National Guard. For the first time there is a serious
 prospect that the pressure to close may even come from
 the courts.
 Resort to judicial authority, however, may not in
 the long run serve the best interests of the university.
 While the appropriate use of the courts and the
 application of the laws of the land remain at the heart of
 the democratic process, sufficient evidence is at hand to
 suggest that use of an outside arbitrator has already
 endangered traditional academic autonomy. More impor-
 tant, many administrators believe that legal action will
 accomplish what they themselves are unable to do, ie.t
 keep the peace on campus, not realizing the price they
 have begun to pay for turning to the courts. For the
 growing number of lawsuits involving colleges and
 universities has given to the courts a new role of
 academic decision-making.
 Consider the ironic pairing of two court cases during
 the week of the Cambodian invasion. On the afternoon
 of May 4, the Court of Common Pleas granted the
 Prosecuting Attorney of Portage County, Ohio, an order
 indefinitely closing the Kent State campus in the wake
 of the killing of four students by National Guardsmen.
 Three days later, a group of students obtained an
 injunction forcing the University of Miami (Florida) to
 reopen doors that had been closed in the aftermath of
 the Kent State deaths. Both orders were granted
 immediately, without time for careful judicial inquiry.
 Thus, Kent State remained closed under court man-
 date while Miami remained open under a similar decree.
 One would have to know much more about the
 precise facts and the legal allegations to judge whether
 either the Ohio or the Florida court erred in issuing its
 order. But undoubtedly the Kent State authorities
 would have closed the campus themselves without a
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 judicial decree, and the Miami administration was
 preparing to reopen that campus the following Monday
 and did not need a judge to stiffen its resolve. The two
 injunctions were not so much erroneous as gratuitous.
 These developments are not as harmless as they may
 at first appear, for the precedent is a dangerous one. A
 brief review of three pending lawsuits will suggest the
 deeper hazards in litigating such issues of campus
 governance and responsibility.
 The administration of Washington University in St.
 Louis is being sued for over $7 million by students
 claiming a denial of their educational and political rights
 during the disturbances this past spring.
 A group of students, faculty members and student
 organizations at Ohio State have been sued for $1
 million on similar grounds.
 A comparable suit is pending against the president
 and regents of the University of Minnesota, though
 without an accompanying money damage claim.
 All three suits reflect the dissatisfaction of politi-
 cally conservative students with unsettled campus condi-
 tions. In the Ohio State case, the plaintiffs are seeking
 recovery from other students and faculty members who,
 they say, created these conditions; in the other two
 cases, the litigants are pressing charges against admini-
 strators who, they claim, condoned such conditions.
 Specifically, the Washington University suit alleges that
 the chancellor failed to call the police to restore order at
 certain troubled times; the Minnesota complaint con-
 tends that the administration allowed the use of campus
 facilities by groups advocating such crimes as fornication
 and sodomy, while failing to protect campus access for
 agencies such as the FBI, ROTC, and Army and Navy
 Intelligence.
 Both the Washington University and Ohio State
 cases focus directly on the "reconstitution" of classes
 this spring. The former attacks Washington's chancellor
 for suggesting that academic departments might wish to
 relax requirements for completing the year's work. The
 Ohio complaint originally named a senior faculty mem-
 ber (since dropped from the suit on technical grounds)
 who made a campus speech attacking the rules of
 student conduct on the day before the Cambodia
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 invasion. Several teaching assistants among the defen-
 dants are charged with participating in the same rally
 and helping to create an atmosphere conducive to
 disorder.
 Two premises underlie these suits. The first carries a
 rather naive assumption: that the courts can somehow
 maintain or restore order on a deeply troubled campus
 when the administration and even the police have failed.
 The other premise-not the least bit naive-is that the
 president or chancellor, having so failed, may be liable
 for heavy damages for his inability to keep the peace.
 Thus the plaintiffs seek, in effect, to have it both ways.
 A
 A Vs a matter of law, the prospect of actual recovery
 in these cases seems quite remote. The courts have never
 really recognized anything like a "property" right to an
 uninterrupted higher education. Whatever contractual
 claim there might be is usually qualified either by
 cautionary language in the college catalogue or by
 conditions beyond the control of the administration that
 would temporarily excuse full performance. Moreover,
 so long as the student receives academic credit and (in
 due course) his degree, the bare contract has presumably
 been fulfilled anyway. Even if a substantial breach could
 be proven, the measure of damages would probably not
 exceed a share of the tuition and fees paid by the
 student or his parents, a share reflecting the period of
 the interruption.
 The only remaining theory of recovery is that of
 tort- the branch of the law which redresses a wide range
 of negligent or willful wrongs. Before one can recover
 for the consequences of another's default, he must first
 show some legal duty that has been breached. The
 nature of the obligation involved here is at best
 uncertain. If a student suffers physical injury through
 the negligence of university officials-in a chemistry
 laboratory, on the athletic field, or even on a university-
 sponsored excursion- he may recover damages against
 the persons he proves to have been at fault, or against
 the institution itself. Perhaps some analogy could be
 drawn between physical injury suffered in this way and
 the consequences of an interrupted spring quarter. But
 the degree of culpability is manifestly different: is the
 chancellor legally liable for failure to call the police in
 the same way he is accountable for not repairing broken
 stadium seats or for hiring a careless bus driver?
 Some observers have suggested that a constitutional
 claim might be advanced. But while the courts have
 begun to develop legal safeguards for the constitutional
 rights of college students, the pertinent decisions protect
 only against denial of educational opportunities on
 arbitrary or discriminatory grounds- e.g., because a
 student happens to be black, or Catholic, or a member
 of SDS (or YAF, for that matter). They do not ensure
 against interruption of a student's education because of
 the political activities of his fellow students.
 Apart from disorder and reconstitution cases, other
 kinds of university conflicts are finding their way to
 court. In New York a group of Long Island University
 students, unhappy about not being sufficiently con-
 sulted in the process of selecting their new chancellor,
 sought a court injunction to block his taking office. The
 suit was dropped by mutual consent when the trustees
 agreed to increase student participation in university
 governance.
 At Madison, Wisconsin, this spring, shortly before a
 teaching assistants' strike, a group of TA's filed suit to
 gain access to English department meetings from which
 they had previously been barred. The judge suggested
 that the department reconsider, at an open meeting, the
 decision that precipitated the suit. The department then
 decided to make future meetings open, thus mooting the
 lawsuit.
 Last fall and winter, the Tufts University commu-
 nity in Medford, Massachusetts, sought a court decision
 on the bitterly divisive issue of minority employment in
 the construction of new campus buildings. Although
 both sides agreed to abide by the judicial decision, the
 Superior Court ultimately declined jurisdiction and left
 the matter to the litigants.
 One may easily forget that litigation is a weapon
 which cuts both ways. In recent months faculty and
 student groups at the universities of Kentucky, Kansas
 and Denver have filed suits to enjoin the further use of
 National Guardsmen on their campuses under nonemer-
 gency conditions. The parents of at least two of the
 students killed at Kent State have brought death actions
 against the university officials. Similar suits will very
 likely be filed on behalf of the two students killed at
 Jackson State College. The extensive searching of dormi-
 tory rooms at Kent State after the May 4 tragedy is also
 being challenged in court. And faculty members at Kent
 State may seek an injunction against further surveillance
 of their courses and interrogation of their students by
 the FBI and other law enforcement agents.
 Countersuits of this kind do not serve to correct the
 balance. They are at best crude weapons to be used
 after-the-fact-after someone has been killed on campus,
 after residence halls have been ransacked, after Guards-
 men have held the campus in a state of siege. Such legal
 recourse is essential, for without it vital interests would
 go unprotected. But these suits do not solve the basic
 problems, and they may encourage encroachment on
 campus autonomy.
 Resort to litigation serves to legitimize a potentially
 dangerous practice. One can only caution against its
 excessive use. Undoubtedly, there will be much more of
 this sort of litigation in the months ahead. But it may
 very well limit some crucial options, rather than widen
 them. The danger to institutional autonomy is clearest in
 the suits involving money damages brought against
 university officials. However unlikely the prospect of
 recovery may be, the threat clearly constricts, and may
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 distort, the exercise of administrative judgment at the
 very time when campus officials need greater flexibility
 and broader scope in dealing with campus unrest. The
 university president who fears a lawsuit if he fails to call
 the police may make the wrong choice simply because
 he is reasonably sure he will not be sued if he does call
 the police.
 The risks are less obvious in other kinds of cases.
 Yet, even in the routine petition for an injunction
 against actual or threatened disorder, the campus that
 turns routinely to the courts has really chosen preserva-
 tion of integrity over autonomy. The mere delegation of
 a range of internal questions to an external authority-
 one which is not accountable to any internal pressures
 and which is not fully cognizant of the institution's
 needs- creates dangerous precedents. For not only the
 issues initially assigned to the court but many others as
 well may eventually pass beyond the control of the
 campus. And the intervention of civil authorities is more
 likely when the courts are asked to issue a restraining
 order that only the police can enforce and only the
 court can interpret.
 At the same time, there is another growing danger:
 that increasing resort to the courts will cause the internal
 decision-making and conflict-resolving channels of a
 university to atrophy. If alternative external forums are
 readily available, the pressure to compel a university to
 put its own house in order may be removed at the very
 time such pressure is most vital.
 Q
 ^Superficially, many comparable questions might be
 raised by lawsuits seeking reinstatement of persons
 dismissed from the university. But the university is not
 threatened as seriously by legal challenges to student
 discipline and faculty dismissals. Such lawsuits rely on
 familiar constitutional doctrines to support the plain-
 tiffs claims to procedural due process or substantive
 civil liberties. When a court holds that a university rule
 violates the First Amendment, it performs a task similar
 to that of reviewing allegedly repressive policies of any
 other agency or body. There is no chance to probe the
 inner workings of the university or to call university
 officials to testify. Nor is there any need to substitute
 the judgment of a court for the wisdom and the
 expertise of men who govern the university.
 Thus the disruption-reconstitution cases really begin
 where the reinstatement cases leave off. The essence of
 the charge in such cases as those against Ohio State, the
 University of Minnesota and Washington University is
 that the president or chancellor made an unwise choice
 among a range of legally permissible options. The court
 can decide such a question only by reviewing the
 judgment and the discretion of the administration on
 matters that require a high level of expertise -and on
 which, given the nature of the times, a wide margin
 (even for error) must be allowed. Yet the theory on
 which the recent suits rest is that a court of law can
 define the duties and responsibilities of a university
 president in time of turmoil with the same precision that
 it can determine when proper care has not been
 exercised in maintaining the buildings and grounds.
 There is at least one hopeful sign that courts
 recognize the need for restraint in this complex, sensitive
 area. Late in June the Federal Court of Appeals in
 Washington, D.C., declined to apply antitrust or con-
 stitutional law principles to an accreditation dispute
 between Marjorie Webster Junior College (a small propri-
 etary institution in Washington) and the Middle States
 Association. Middle States holds that proprietary col-
 leges are prima facie ineligible for membership.
 The Marjorie Webster case suggests that courts are
 becoming aware of the risks of entering the "academic
 thicket." In the Court of Appeals, for example, eleven
 professional and accrediting organizations filed friend-of-
 the-court briefs backing Middle States. Some defended
 the particular standard of exclusion involved. Others,
 including the American Bar Association, the Association
 of American Law Schools and the American Association
 of University Professors, dealt only with the appropriate
 standard of judicial review. The latter groups argued that
 courts should tread warily in a field where judicial ex-
 pertise and precedent are lacking, and where the con-
 sequences of broad intrusion are difficult to estimate.
 The court, of course, might well have reached the
 same conclusion without any advice from these inter-
 ested non-parties. But the participation of so many
 professional academic groups is significant. It suggests
 both the depth of concern for the judicial role in
 complex academic controversies and a way of urging
 caution upon courts faced with such issues.
 Whether or not the courts deal with such cases, the
 issues that generate them will surely persist. For it is
 clear that judicial intervention will not remove the
 problems that divide and disrupt campuses. It is equally
 clear that judicial abstinence will not bring peace to the
 campus. If the courts decline to intercede, responsibility
 for solving internal conflicts will revert to the campus,
 where it belongs. One last effort must be made to
 develop on-campus tribunals that can resolve issues
 which are now increasingly relegated to external forums.
 Rather than going to the courts, cannot campus
 problems be solved on campus with comparable integrity
 and vastly greater expertise? Of course, campus decisions
 may not always be obeyed. But neither may court
 orders, as the number of recent contempt proceedings
 suggests.
 The inherent advantages of trying to utilize every
 available campus mechanism are substantial. The hazards
 of surrendering academic control to external consti-
 tuencies are great enough without the university's adding
 its own self-inflicted wounds. As the situation is now
 progressing, we may well be headed rapidly in the wrong
 direction.
 CHANGE/September-October 1970 41
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Tue, 07 Jun 2016 20:21:29 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
